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THE IMPACT OF PROFICIENCY TESTING INFORMATION 
AND ERROR AVERSIONS 
ON THE WEIGHT GIVEN TO FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
 
Abstract 
 Fingerprint examiners regularly participate in tests designed to assess their 
proficiency.  These tests provide information relevant to the weight of fingerprint evidence, 
but no prior research has directly examined how jurors react to proficiency testing 
information.  Using a nationally representative sample of American adults, we examined 
the impact of proficiency testing information on the weight given to the opinions of 
fingerprint examiners by mock jurors considering a hypothetical criminal case.  The 
fingerprint examiner’s level of performance on a proficiency test (high, medium, low, or 
very low), but not the type of errors committed on the test (false positive identifications, 
false negative identifications, or a mix of both types of errors), affected the weight that 
jury-eligible adults gave to an examiner’s opinion that latent fingerprints recovered from a 
crime scene matched the defendant’s fingerprints, which in turn affected judgments about 
the defendant’s guilt.  Jurors who had no information about proficiency gave similar weight 
to the testimony as jurors exposed to highly proficient examiners, suggesting that jurors 
assume fingerprint examiners perform at high levels of proficiency unless informed 
otherwise.  We also found that a plurality of Americans deems false acquittals just as 
aversive as false convictions and a significant minority deems false acquittals more serious.  
These differences in error aversions predicted differences in evidentiary assessments, 
suggesting that error aversions of jurors may play an important role in criminal trials.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF PROFICIENCY TESTING INFORMATION 
AND ERROR AVERSIONS 
ON THE WEIGHT GIVEN TO FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Following Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and subsequent  
revisions to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, judges must ensure that an expert relies on 
reliable methods and principles to reach conclusions.  The error rate associated with an 
expert’s method is an important consideration when determining whether the output of the 
expert’s method is sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence (Koehler, 2008; 
Meixner & Diamond, 2014).  If the expert’s opinions are admitted, information about the 
error rate associated with an expert’s method is relevant to determine the probative value 
of the expert’s opinions.  Jurors inevitably make assumptions about the fallibility of an 
expert’s method, and, when empirical information is available about the true error rate, this 
information should be admitted to avoid incorrect assumptions and also to enable jurors to 
make comparisons across experts who utilize different methods with different error rates 
(as permitted in federal court by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(e)).         
 
In many fields, experts take proficiency tests designed to measure their levels of 
accuracy and reliability as part of their regular training and accreditation.1 For instance, 
many fingerprint examiners associated with state crime labs participate in annual 
proficiency testing.  In these tests, the examiners are given a case file containing latent 
fingerprints impressions hypothetically taken from a crime scene along with rolled 
fingerprint impressions from persons who may have left the latent fingerprints.  The 
examiner’s task is to determine whether the latent prints provide sufficient information for 
identification purposes and, if so, whether the latent prints match any of the rolled prints.  
The test administrator then scores the test answers for number of latent prints deemed 
unusable, the number of hits (correct matches of latent prints to exemplar prints), correct 
rejections (correct conclusions of no match), misses (incorrect conclusions of no match), 
and false alarms (incorrect matches of latent prints to exemplar prints) (see Garrett & 
Mitchell, 2018, for a fuller discussion of proficiency testing in the context of fingerprint 
examinations).  In practice, the proficiency tests currently commonly used are not blind, 
not demanding, and may not sufficiently assess the skill of an expert  (Garrett & Mitchell, 
2018).  However, rigorous proficiency testing could provide expert-specific information 
about the reliability of an expert’s work.   
 
Evidentiary rules do not prescribe specific levels of proficiency that must be 
achieved to qualify a witness as an expert, nor have judges demanded rigorous proficiency 
information be provided in litigation.  We argue that the level of proficiency demanded for 
                                                 
1 In 2014, 98% of all publicly funded crime laboratories in the U.S. engaged in some form of proficiency 
testing of their analysts.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2014).  Most (95%) employed declared tests in 
which participants knew they were participating in a test.  A smaller percentage used blind testing (10%), 
with participants not knowing their work was part of test, or random case reanalysis (35%), with prior samples 
being re-examined by new analysts to measure consistency in conclusions.   
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admissibility of an expert’s opinion should depend, in part, on the degree to which judges 
believe that jurors will properly utilize error rate information when determining the weight 
to give to an expert’s opinion.  If jurors properly understand and utilize proficiency testing 
results when evaluating expert evidence, then judges should be more willing to admit 
expert opinions along with error rate information derived from proficiency testing.  If jurors 
fail to understand and take into account error rate information, then greater care in 
admissibility determinations should follow, due to fear that jurors will over-value the 
expert’s opinions relative to the risk of error. 
 
The present research examines whether jury-eligible Americans understand and 
utilize proficiency testing results when determining how much weight to give to a forensic 
analyst’s testimony.  Specifically, we examine whether jury-eligible adults understand the 
significance of proficiency testing information for judging a fingerprint examiner’s level 
of expertise and whether they take this proficiency information into account when 
determining how much weight to give to a fingerprint examiner’s opinion that a latent print 
taken from a crime scene matches the defendant’s fingerprints.  We present mock jurors 
drawn from a representative sample of American adults with identification opinions of 
fingerprint examiners who vary in their levels of proficiency as part of the evidence in a 
hypothetical criminal case and ask these mock jurors to assess the strength of the evidence 
in the case and the expertise of the examiner.  If jurors properly understand proficiency 
testing information, their judgments about the strength of the evidence and expertise of the 
examiner will increase as the examiner’s proficiency increases.  We also examine whether 
the types of errors committed on the proficiency test matter, asking whether the 
identification opinions of examiners who are more prone to false positives (i.e., erroneous 
identifications) are judged more cautiously than the opinions of examiners prone to false 
negatives (i.e., erroneous exclusions) or to a mix of both types of error.    
 
In Part I, we situate our study in the context of prior research on the assumptions of 
jurors about the reliability and accuracy of forensic evidence and how jurors respond to 
information about forensic error rates.  We describe our study’s methods in Part II and 
present the study’s results in Part III.  In Part IV, we discuss the implications of our results 
for the use of expert testimony in criminal trials.  While jurors have had some difficulty 
understanding other forms of information about forensic error rates, the participants in our 
study understood the significance of the proficiency information and deemed it important 
to their evidentiary assessments.  Furthermore, our representative sample, when given no 
information about proficiency testing results, acted as if the expert was highly proficient, 
even though this assumption may be invalid in a number of cases.  Accordingly, our study 
supports the view that proficiency testing information should be admissible at trial to 
ensure jurors have an accurate picture of the expert’s fallibility and to help jurors determine 
what weight to give to the expert’s opinions.2 
                                                 
2 The results of proficiency tests taken by individual forensic analysts are not generally made public, but such 
test results often exist and can be obtained through pretrial discovery or questioning at trial (see Garrett & 
Mitchell, 2018).  Alternatively, average field-wide proficiency levels can be estimated from publicly 
available data, but these estimates likely overestimate the true proficiency level of many analysts because of 
the relative ease of the proficiency tests compared to real case work (see Koehler, 2017).  Our focus is on 
individual-level proficiency results because these results provide direct evidence of an analyst’s level of 
expertise. 
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We also discuss an important secondary finding of our study:  we asked participants 
whether they deemed false convictions or false acquittals a more serious error or whether 
they deemed the errors equally bad, providing data on the distribution of error aversions 
among the general public.  Surprisingly high percentages of the public rate false acquittals 
to be worse than or as bad as false convictions, and the error aversions that jurors bring to 
trials appear to affect how they interpret and weigh evidence in a criminal trial.  This 
finding has potentially broad implications for the criminal justice system and the practical 
meaning of the presumption of innocence.  
 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF ERROR IN FORENSICS 
 
A. Juror Sensitivity to Forensic Error Rates 
 
Although no prior study has examined how proficiency testing information for a 
particular expert affects jurors’ assessments of that expert’s opinions, prior research has 
examined how potential jurors respond to other sources of information about the error rates 
associated with a forensic identification method.  In perhaps the earliest study of this kind, 
Koehler, Chia, and Lindsey (1995) presented jury-eligible participants with a summary of 
a murder case in which DNA evidence provided an important link between the defendant 
and the victim and found that information about random match probabilities, but not 
information about laboratory error rates, affected verdict choices.  This finding was 
concerning because laboratory error rates tend to be larger than random match probabilities 
in the context of DNA evidence, yet potential jurors showed little sensitivity to laboratory 
error rates when assessing evidence of a supposed DNA match.   
    
In contrast, Schklar and Diamond (1999) presented mock jurors with information 
about a hypothetical sexual assault crime, including expert testimony about (a) the 
probability that the defendant’s DNA matched DNA recovered from the victim, (b) the 
probability of a random match, and (c) the probability of a laboratory error during the DNA 
matching process based on proficiency testing of the laboratory. They found that the risk 
of laboratory error reduced the likelihood participants would vote to convict the defendant, 
more so than the risk of a random match.  They also found that the laboratory error rates 
disclosed by the expert were lower than the error rates expected by many of the participants.  
Thus, Schklar and Diamond (1999) found that laboratory error rate information may reduce 
or bolster confidence in forensic evidence, depending on the juror’s pre-existing 
expectancies about those error rates.   
 
In another study of DNA evidence, Thompson, Kaasa and Peterson (2013) 
examined how potential jurors confronted with a rape case and DNA evidence responded 
to information about the random match probability as well as information about the “false 
report probability,” which mirrors laboratory-error conditions from earlier studies. The 
random match probability was held constant (at one in one trillion), but three variations on 
the false report probability were compared:  the DNA analyst testified than an incorrect 
match due to accidental contamination of the DNA sample from the crime was impossible, 
occurs with approximately one in 10,000 samples, or occurs with approximately one in 100 
samples.  In a first study, chances-of-guilt estimates and rates of convictions both varied 
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inversely with false report probability, but in a second study where the defendant had a 
strong alibi, the analyst’s admission of that accidental contamination was possible had no 
effect on chance-of-guilt estimates or conviction rates.  Secondary data analysis suggested 
that participants were sensitive to the error information in the second study but were 
already so skeptical of the prosecution’s case that the information had no marginal impact 
on evidentiary assessments. 
 
In prior research, we found that a fingerprint examiner’s admission that fingerprint 
identifications were sometimes erroneous and that his own identification opinion in the 
case at hand might be in error significantly reduced the weight given to fingerprint evidence 
in a criminal trial (Garrett & Mitchell, 2013). This result held whether the fingerprint expert 
raised the possibility of error during direct testimony or conceded that possibility on cross-
examination.  Because the great majority of our participants had great confidence in the 
reliability of fingerprint identifications, merely acknowledging the possibility of error 
altered expectations about the evidence and reduced confidence in it.  Koehler (2012) found 
a similar discounting effect when a forensic expert admitted during direct examination that 
his shoeprint-based identification could be the result of an error during the matching 
process, but cross-examination highlighting the risk of error had no additional impact. 
 
Other research has examined the impact of disclosing the limits of a forensic 
method, without focusing specifically on error rates associated with the method.  
McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009) found that explaining the subjective and unscientific 
nature of identifications based on hair comparisons increased the weight given to an 
expert’s probability estimate of a match, suggesting that this information helped jurors 
better understand the evidence without increasing skepticism of the method. Koehler and 
colleagues (2016) informed participants that the methods used to make bite-mark and 
fingerprint identifications had either undergone no scientific testing or a great deal of 
scientific testing; in a first study using an MTurk sample and a written case description, 
participants viewed both types of forensic identifications as stronger evidence when told 
the methods had been scientifically tested, but evidentiary assessments by a second sample 
recruited from a jury pool that watched a realistic trial simulation were not affected by 
whether the method had been scientifically validated.  
 
Collectively, these studies show that jurors often are sensitive to information about 
the error rates associated with a forensic method, but this sensitivity depends on the nature 
of the error information and the assumptions jurors have regarding a particular forensic 
specialty.  Jurors are likely to find it easy to discount general concerns about forensic 
evidence, including general error rate information, when confronted with an experienced 
expert with an impressive background, or when other evidence in the case corroborates the 
expert’s conclusions. Moreover, many jurors may fail to appreciate the significance of 
information about a method’s scientific status.   
 
However, error information derived from proficiency testing of the testifying expert 
should be easy to understand and difficult to ignore.  First, proficiency testing results for 
fingerprint examiners are straightforward:  they reveal the number of correct 
identifications, incorrect identifications, correct exclusions, and incorrect exclusions.  No 
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advanced understanding of statistics or science is necessary to understand a proficiency 
test’s results.  Second, proficiency testing results are highly probative of the risk of error 
in the case at hand because they provide direct empirical evidence of the witness’s level of 
expertise and care in utilizing a particular forensic method.  All things being equal, experts 
with higher scores on a proficiency test (i.e., fewer missed items) should engender greater 
confidence, but in the context of a legal case, the testimony of an expert prone to false 
negative errors who testifies for the prosecution may be given greater weight than an expert 
who makes objectively fewer errors but is prone to false positive errors.  Also, as Schklar 
and Diamond (1999) showed in the context of DNA evidence, the effect of error rate 
information derived from proficiency tests will likely depend on the expectancies about 
forensic evidence that jurors bring to the trial.  Proficiency testing results that reveal 
relatively poor performance compared to other fingerprint examiners may nonetheless 
bolster confidence in an examiner’s opinion if those results exceed jurors’ expectations 
about usual error rates.     
 
B.  How Proficient Are Fingerprint Examiners? 
 
Logically, proficiency testing results set bounds on the levels of accuracy and 
reliability that forensic analysts can achieve in their work.  The information value of these 
bounds depends on the degree to which the proficiency tests simulate real work conditions.  
If items on a proficiency test are more difficult than items encountered in real casework, 
then arguably the proficiency test’s results have no relevance in court for admissibility or 
weight determinations because a forensic analyst could perform poorly on the proficiency 
test but still perform well in the field.  If items on a proficiency test are easier than items 
encountered in real case work, however, the proficiency test’s results set strong upper 
bounds on an analyst’s hit rates and correct rejection rates and weak lower bounds on miss 
rates and false alarm rates.  Strong performance on an easy test provides little guarantee of 
good work in the field, but poor performance on an easy test should be cause for concern 
about an analyst’s fieldwork. 
 
The consensus among forensic evidence scholars is that the fingerprint comparisons 
found on proficiency tests commonly used by American crime labs are considerably less 
challenging than fingerprint comparisons found in real case work (e.g., Cole, 2005; 
Koehler, 2017; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”), 
2016).  Indeed, the head of the Collaborative Testing Service (“CTS”), a leading provider 
of forensic proficiency tests, has conceded that “easy tests are favored by the forensic 
community” (PCAST, 2016, p. 57).  The latent fingerprint impressions used in proficiency 
tests tend to be higher quality than those obtained from a typical crime scene, and typically 
the tests are declared tests (i.e., known to be tests rather than real cases) that are not 
monitored by an independent administrator and thus may sometimes involve collaboration 
among analysts to arrive at answers to the test.  
    
Notwithstanding the relative ease of the CTS proficiency tests compared to real 
case work, results from these tests are informative because they likely set a floor on error 
rates within a forensic field.  For the years 1995 to 2016, published results of CTS 
fingerprint proficiency tests reveal false positive error rates that vary annually from 0 to 
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23% and false negative error rates that vary annually from 0 to 43% (Garrett & Mitchell, 
2018).3  These results show that both false positive and false negative errors are common 
on even relatively easy fingerprint proficiency tests, and the typically higher false negative 
rates found on these tests suggest that examiners assume a conservative posture with 
respect to positive identifications, because a false identification is seen as a serious error 
within the field.    
 
Proficiency tests utilizing samples similar to those encountered in the field likewise 
find evidence of both false positives and false negatives among fingerprint examiners, with 
the latter error rates typically far exceeding the former, providing further evidence of a 
conservative response bias on declared proficiency tests.  Haber and Haber (2014) 
tabulated error rates across several fingerprint proficiency studies and found false positive 
error rates ranging from 0 to 3% and false negative error rates ranging from 1 to 13% when 
only incorrect exclusions were counted, but ranging from 9 to 55% when combining 
incorrect exclusions with incorrect inconclusives (i.e., when a matching print is declared 
unsuitable for comparison).  For instance, in two proficiency studies conducted by Tangen, 
Thompson and McCarthy (2011), trained examiners made few false positive errors 
(although some individuals made multiple false positive errors) but many false negative 
errors. Thompson and colleagues (2013) observed that examiners on average failed to 
declare as matches over 27% of the prints that previously had been declared matches in the 
real cases from which the test prints were drawn. 
 
C. Overview of the Present Research 
  
The present study examines whether potential jurors do in fact treat proficiency 
testing results as probative of a fingerprint examiner’s expertise and, accordingly, give 
greater weight to the identification opinions of highly proficient examiners.  To test this 
hypothesis, we presented participants with a description of a case in which fingerprint 
examiners of varying proficiency opine that the latent fingerprints recovered from a 
weapon used in an armed robbery matches the fingerprints of the defendant.  Proficiency 
information is conveyed through disclosure of the results of a recent proficiency test taken 
by the testifying examiner, with the examiner in one condition having received a perfect 
score on the proficiency test, one having received a score of only 66%, and other examiners 
receiving scores between these extremes (scores of 98%, 92%, or 86%).   We examined 
this wide range of proficiency levels because some examiners do score perfectly on existing 
tests and because we presently do not know the lower bound on the proficiency of testifying 
examiners.  We posited a score of 66% to be near or below the minimal level of proficiency 
of an examiner who would be offered to testify; scores closer to chance performance are 
likely to be grounds for exclusion.4 
                                                 
3  CTS only publicly reports aggregate test results (i.e., the number of errors made across all print 
comparisons); thus, the reported rates reflect error rates within the field rather than for individual analysts or 
laboratories. 
4 Some of these levels may strike one as quite low. However, courts often have not required disclosure of 
individual proficiency test results (see Garrett & Mitchell, 2018), and the number of errors observed on 
many of the proficiency tests that are given annually to examiners proffer suggest some examiners who 
testify may have  relatively low proficiency scores. In any event, the primary rationale for including lower 
proficiency score levels was to see how jurors reacted to this information and to compare the treatment of 
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We also manipulated information about the nature of the errors committed on the 
proficiency test to examine whether potential jurors treat false positive errors as more 
significant than false negative errors when weighing a positive identification opinion (the 
fingerprint expert in our mock case always opines that the latent prints match the 
defendant’s prints).  We therefore varied whether the examiner’s errors on the proficiency 
test were all false positives, all false negatives, or a mix of both errors.  The error type 
variable permits examination of whether potential jurors are particularly skeptical of 
fingerprint examiners testifying for the prosecution who are prone to false positive errors 
and/or particularly accepting of fingerprint examiners testifying for the prosecution who 
are prone to false negative errors. 
 
Although the criminal justice system treats false convictions as more serious than 
false acquittals, which explains the heightened burden of proof in criminal trials, individual 
jurors may not share this normative view.  We asked participants whether they deem false 
acquittals or false convictions to be a more serious mistake or whether they deem the two 
mistakes as equally serious, so that we could examine whether individual differences in 
error aversions affect the impact of the errors committed by fingerprint examiners. 
    
Finally, to gauge default assumptions about the proficiency of fingerprint 
examiners, we included a control condition in which a fingerprint examiner gave an 
identification opinion but about whom no proficiency testing information was disclosed.  
By comparing evidentiary assessments in this control condition to those in the various 
proficiency testing conditions, we are able to gauge when an examiner’s proficiency level 
falls above or below the assumed level of proficiency of fingerprint examiners.  For 
instance, if jurors assume perfect proficiency on the part of fingerprint examiners, then 
evidentiary assessments in the control and perfect proficiency conditions should not differ. 
 
III.  METHOD5 
 
A. Participants 
  
Most mock jurors studies use convenience samples, but we commissioned Qualtrics 
to recruit a nationally representative sample with respect to gender, race/ethnicity, age, 
income, and geographic location in the United States to increase the generalizability of our 
results.  A total of 1,450 adults received approximately $3 each for their participation in 
the study, which took less than 15 minutes (average time to completion was just over nine 
minutes).  Seven hundred participants self-identified as male (48.3%) and 750 as female 
(51.7%).  Approximately twelve percent of the participants were aged 18 to 24, 19% 25 to 
34, 18% 35 to 44, 19% 45 to 54, 17% 55 to 64, 12% 65 to 74, 2% 75 to 84, and less than 
1% 85 or older.  Nine hundred and eighty-seven participants self-identified as White 
(68.1%), 182 as Black or African-Americans (12.6%), 168 as Hispanic (11.6%), 55 as 
Asian (3.8%), 10 as American Indian or Alaska Native (7%), 5 as Pacific Islander or Native 
Hawaiian (.3%), and 43 as other (3%).  Participants resided in the West (22.7%), Midwest 
                                                 
lower proficiency examiners to that of an examiner for whom proficiency level is unknown, to gauge 
assumptions about examiner proficiency. 
5 Study materials and data are publicly available at https://osf.io/r63tz/. 
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(21.5%), South (36.6%) and Northeast (19.2%) regions of the U.S.  More participants 
reported consistently voting for Democratic (40.1%) than Republican (30.9%) candidates, 
with the remainder stating that they have no consistent preference between the two main 
political parties (28.8%).  Five hundred and twenty-eight participants had served on a jury 
(36.4%), with most of the trials being criminal trials (78%).   
 
B. Procedure and Materials 
  
The experimental materials were created using Qualtrics’ online survey service, 
and participants completed the experiment on their own computers or smart phones by 
accessing a link to the online survey.  The survey software randomly assigned participants 
to one of 14 conditions:  our two independent variables (five proficiency levels and three 
error types) produced 13 experimental conditions rather than 15 conditions because the 
condition in which the examiner received a perfect score on the proficiency test involved 
no errors (hence, the error type variable was not manipulated at this perfect proficiency 
level); the fourteenth condition was the control condition, in which participants received 
fingerprint evidence without proficiency testing information for the fingerprint examiner. 
    
 The study began by eliciting participants’ informed consent and obtaining 
information on participant demographics, political affiliations, prior jury service, and 
answers to the multiple-choice version of the Berlin Numeracy Test along with two 
subjective numeracy questions (how good are you with percentages, and how helpful do 
you find graphs and tables in news stories) (Cokely et al., 2012). 6  Participants then 
received a description of a pending criminal case in which the defendant had been linked 
to a crime by fingerprint evidence: 
 
A convenience store was robbed.  The robber wore a mask and showed a 
gun but did not fire the gun. When running from the store, the robber’s hand 
caught on the door, causing him to drop the gun.  No other person handled 
the gun before it was secured by the police.  The police arrested a person 
who was found in the vicinity shortly after the robbery.  No proceeds of the 
crime were found on this person, and the clerk at the convenience store has 
not been able to identify this person as the robber because the robber wore 
a mask.  
  
A fingerprint examiner compared fingerprints taken from the handle of the 
gun dropped at the crime scene to the fingerprints taken from the Defendant 
on an inked card.  The fingerprint examiner issued a report concluding 
that: “A fingerprint recovered from the gun matched the right thumb 
of the defendant.”   
                                                 
6 Only 21 participants (1.4%) selected correct answers for all four items on the Berlin Numeracy Test, and 
only 93 (6.4%) correctly answered three of the items; 375 (25.9%) correctly answered two items, 628 (43.3%) 
correctly answered one item, and 333 (23%) failed to answer any items correctly.  In contrast, over 60% of 
the participants rated themselves as somewhat good to extremely good with percentages, and 90% of the 
participants stated that they find tables and graphs in newspapers to be somewhat or extremely helpful.  Thus, 
while much of our sample subjectively rated themselves as numerate, our objective measure found much 
lower rates of numeracy. 
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As is common within mock juror studies (e.g., McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009; Schklar 
& Diamond, 1999; Scurich & John, 2013; Thompson et al., 2013), we intentionally kept 
the case description simple and focused on the fingerprint evidence to avoid possible 
bolstering of the fingerprint evidence through other corroborating evidence (corroborating 
evidence can lend credibility to the fingerprint identification and allay any concerns 
potential jurors may have about the reliability of the fingerprint evidence).  Furthermore, 
although fingerprint examiners employ a variety of terms to indicate source identification 
(see Table 1 in Garrett & Mitchell, 2013), we chose one of the simpler formulations, using 
“match” terminology to avoid the need for an extended discussion of the expert’s testimony 
and because the different formulations tend to produce the same results (Garrett & 
Mitchell, 2013; see also Kadane & Koehler, 2018).  
 
   Participants in the control condition received only the above case description, but 
participants in the proficiency testing conditions received information about the examiner’s 
performance on a recent test.  For instance, in the high proficiency/mixed error condition, 
participants received the following additional information immediately after the above case 
description: 
 
In evaluating this evidence, it may be helpful to have this additional 
information about the fingerprint examiner: 
 
A proficiency test is a test where a fingerprint examiner is given 100 pairs 
of fingerprints to determine whether or not each of the two prints originated 
from the same source.  The goal of this test is to assess how accurate and 
reliable a particular fingerprint examiner is at making fingerprint-based 
identifications.  The administrator who prepares the proficiency test knows 
whether each pair of prints come from the same source or from different 
sources.  Therefore, the test administrator can determine the percentage of 
test items in which the expert correctly concluded that the fingerprints did 
or did not match.  It is common practice in many crime labs to have 
fingerprint examiners participate in proficiency tests of this kind. 
 
From sworn testimony in another case, we have information about results 
on a recent proficiency test for the fingerprint examiner who is involved in 
this case.   
 
In particular, this fingerprint examiner received a score of 98 percent on the 
proficiency test.  This means that in 98 out of 100 trials on the proficiency 
test, this fingerprint examiner correctly concluded that the test prints did or 
did not match.  For one pair of fingerprints, the examiner incorrectly 
concluded that the fingerprints matched when the fingerprints did not in 
fact come from the same source, and for one pair the examiner incorrectly 
concluded that the fingerprints did not match when the fingerprints did in 
fact come from the same source. 
 
THE IMPACT OF PROFICIENCY  
 10 
Here is a summary of this examiner’s results on the proficiency test: 
 
Accurate Identifications:  98 out of 100 pairs 
Erroneous Identifications:  2 out of 100 pairs 
 
Error Breakdown: 
 
Mistaken Matches:   1 
Mistaken Non-matches:  1 
 
In the proficiency conditions, the examiner received a score of 100, 98, 92, 86, or 66 on 
the proficiency test, and in the conditions where errors were made, the errors were 
described as all mistaken matches, all mistaken non-matches, or an equal mix of mistaken 
matches and mistaken non-matches.7   
 
 After reading the case description and, as applicable, the proficiency testing 
information, participants completed the dependent measures:  (a) a rating of the likelihood 
that the defendant left his fingerprints at the scene of the crime (answered on a scale ranging 
from 0% to 100% likely, in ten percent intervals, which means responses were on an 
eleven-point equal interval scale); (b) a rating of the reliability of the fingerprint evidence 
(answered on a six-point scale ranging from very reliable to very unreliable); (c) a rating 
of the level of expertise of the fingerprint examiner involved in the case (answered on a 
seven-point scale ranging from far above average to far below average, with average in the 
middle); (d) a rating of the likelihood the person arrested for the crime was in fact the 
robber (answered on a seven-point scale ranging from definitely is the robber to definitely 
is not the robber); (e) a rating of the strength of the prosecution’s case (answered on a four-
point scale ranging from extremely weak to extremely strong).8     
 
Finally, participants indicated whether they believe each person’s fingerprints and 
DNA are unique (both answered as yes, no, or probably), specified their view on the 
reliability of fingerprint evidence generally (answered on a six-point scale ranging from 
very reliable to very unreliable), and specified whether they believe that falsely convicting 
an innocent person or failing to convict a guilty person causes more harm to society or 
whether they believe the two errors cause equal harm.   
 
IV.  RESULTS 
  
                                                 
7 One of the proficiency conditions used in the original study contained a typographical error in the paragraph 
describing the errors made by the examiner, but the information provided in the summary table was correct.  
We corrected this typographical error and submitted this corrected description to a sample of American adults 
recruited through Amazon’s MTurk service.  The MTurk sample and Qualtrics sample, the latter of which 
was exposed to the typo, did not differ in their mean ratings of the examiner’s level of expertise.  Accordingly, 
we report in the text the results for all of the proficiency conditions collected using the representative sample 
collected throught Qualtrics.   
8 An attention check item (in which participants were directed by the question to select a specific multiple 
choice answer) was included among the dependent measures; those who failed to answer correctly were 
excluded from the study. 
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Table 1 reports mean scores on all of our dependent measures by experimental 
condition. We first examined whether participants differed in their ratings of the 
expertise of the fingerprint examiner who performed differently on the proficiency test.9 
Expertise ratings did differ by proficiency level (β = -.42, p < .001), but expertise ratings 
did not differ by proficiency error type (β < .01) nor did the error type variable interact 
with the proficiency level variable (β < .01).10 Examiners receiving a perfect score on the 
proficiency test were rated as significantly more expert than examiners scoring 98 on the 
test (t(435)=3.12, p = .002), who were rated as significantly more expert than those scoring 
92 (t(624)=3.67, p < .001), who were rated as significantly more expert than those scoring 
86 (t(592)=3.38, p = .001), who were rated as significantly more expert than those scoring 
66 (t(606)=5.46, p < .001).  Therefore, participants treated proficiency level—but not error 
type—as having informational value with respect to the examiner’s level of expertise 
across all levels of proficiency.    
 
  
                                                 
9 For analyses that examine the potential effects of the error type variable, we exclude the perfect proficiency 
and control conditions, which did not manipulate this variable.     
10 All statistical tests were conducted using IBM’s SPSS Statistics program, Version 25.  For most statistical 
tests, we present unstandardized coefficients from multiple regression analyses as the effect size measure; 
these coefficients indicate the amount by which a dependent variable changes if we change an independent 
variable by one unit keeping other independent variables constant.  For some tests, we present correlation 
statistics as the measure of the strength of asssoction between two variables.  We report results of linear 
regressions due to their ease of interpretation, but a number of our dependent measures were ordinal rather 
than continuous.  Therefore we conducted the same analyses using ordinal regressions and observed the same 
pattern of results with one minor exception:  one of the interaction contrasts was significant for one of the 
dependent measures in the ordinal but not the linear regression. We discount this finding because it was the 
product of multiple comparisons and no other interactions were observed in ordinal or linear regressions.  As 
we discuss in the text, the error type variable deserves further study, but the present results suggest that 
proficiency level rather than error type matters most. 
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Table 1: Dependent variable means by condition 
 
Condition Likelihood 
Defendant 
Left 
Fingerprints 
at Scene 
(1-11 scale, 
less to more 
likely) 
 
M 
 (n, SD) 
 
Reliability of 
the 
Fingerprint 
Evidence 
(1-6 scale, 
more to less 
reliable) 
 
 
M 
 (n, SD) 
Expertise of 
Fingerprint 
Examiner 
(1-7 scale, far 
above to far 
below average) 
 
 
 
M 
 (n, SD) 
Likelihood 
Defendant 
Robber  
(1-7 scale, less 
to more likely) 
 
 
 
 
M  
(n, SD) 
Strength of 
Prosecution 
Case 
(1-4 scale, 
weak to 
strong) 
 
 
 
M  
(n, SD) 
Control 8.36  
(110, 3.05) 
2.02 
(110, 1.11) 
2.71 
(110, 1.19) 
5.00 
(110, 1.51) 
2.82 
(110, .68) 
100% 
Proficiency 
8.87 
(105, 3.05) 
1.82 
(105, .88) 
1.70 
(105, 1.06) 
5.22 
(105, 1.47) 
3.07 
(105, .75) 
98% 
Proficiency 
     
2 False 
Positives (FP) 
8.06 
(112, 2.99) 
2.03 
(112, 1.01) 
2.19 
(112, 1.23) 
5.05 
(112, 1.57) 
2.92 
9112, .74) 
2 False 
Negatives (FN) 
8.21 
(112, 3.21) 
1.96 
(112, .87) 
2.10 
(112, 1.04) 
5.21 
(112,1.33) 
2.89 
(112, .70) 
1 FP, 1 FN  8.44 
(108, 3.12) 
1.97 
(108, 1.01) 
1.99 
(108, 1.12) 
5.13 
(108, 1.55) 
3.03 
(108, .69) 
92% 
Proficiency 
     
8 FP 7.95 
(106, 3.17) 
2.35 
(106, 1.02) 
2.45 
(106, 1.27) 
4.86 
(106, 1.53) 
2.76 
(106, .72) 
8 FN 7.88 
(93, 2.98) 
2.16 
(93, 1.03) 
2.49 
(93, 1.33) 
5.05 
(93, 1.36) 
2.86 
(93, .67) 
4 FP, 4 FN 8.15 
(95, 2.76) 
2.27 
(95, 1.02) 
2.38 
(95, 1.14) 
4.88 
(95, 1.46) 
2.80 
(95, .63) 
86% 
Proficiency 
     
14 FP 7.72 
(101, 2.69) 
2.37 
(102, .89) 
2.73 
(102, 1.20) 
4.66 
(102, 1.35) 
2.69 
(102, .60) 
14 FN 7.17 
(95, 3.11) 
2.34 
(95, 1.04) 
2.69 
(95, 1.26) 
4.81 
(95, 1.53) 
2.77 
(95, .71) 
7 FP, 7 FN 7.69 
(103, 2.70) 
2.56 
(103, .99) 
2.92 
(103, 1.25) 
4.76 
(103, 1.35) 
2.58 
(103, .59) 
66% 
Proficiency 
     
34 FP 6.46 
(101, 2.44) 
2.84 
(101, 1.28) 
3.50 
(101, 1.57) 
4.42 
(101, 1.32) 
2.47 
(101, .67) 
34 FN 7.70 
(106, 2.76) 
2.48 
(106, 1.05) 
3.32 
(106, 1.50) 
4.73 
(106, 1.34) 
2.65 
(106, .70) 
17 FP, 17 FN 6.96 
(101, 2.15) 
2.88 
(101, 1.03) 
3.38 
(101, 1.48) 
4.62 
(101, 1.09) 
2.48 
(101, .59) 
 
 The proficiency level information also affected the weight given to the examiner’s 
testimony in the case at hand.  Participant perceptions of the reliability of the fingerprint 
evidence and of the likelihood that the defendant’s prints matched the latent prints found 
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on the gun recovered from the crime scene (as the fingerprint examiner testified) depended 
on the examiner’s proficiency level (β = -.24, p < .001, and β = .37, p < .001, respectively)  
but not the type of errors committed by the examiner on the proficiency test.   
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, below, we observed a linear trend in mean ratings of the 
likelihood the defendant’s prints were on the gun, but not every contrast produced 
significant differences in ratings:  likelihood ratings given by participants who read 
testimony from the examiner who scored 100 on the proficiency test were significantly 
higher than the ratings in all other proficiency level conditions except for the examiner who 
scored 98 on the test; likelihood ratings given when the examiner scored 98 on the test 
were significantly higher than those given when the examiners scored 86 and 66 on the 
test; likelihood ratings given when the examiner scored 66 on the test were significantly 
lower than ratings in every other condition (p < .05 for all t-tests for the relevant 
comparisons).   
 
These differences in likelihood ratings were quite substantial:  for instance, the most 
common likelihood rating for participants reading testimony from the very low proficiency 
examiner was 60%, whereas the most common likelihood rating for participants reading 
testimony from the perfect proficiency examiner was 100% (chosen by more than half the 
participants in this condition).   
 
Figure 1: Print likelihood ratings by proficiency level 
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 Participants’ ratings of the likelihood the defendant left his prints on the gun 
predicted judgments about the defendants’ likelihood of conviction and the strength of the 
prosecution’s case (β = .25, p < .001, r = .51, and β = .11, p < .001, r = .48, respectively).  
We also examined whether the error type variable might have directly affected judgments 
about the likelihood of conviction and case strength, even though it did not do so indirectly 
by its effects on judgments of the likelihood the defendant left his prints on the gun.  For 
example, perhaps the prosecution’s willingness to use a fingerprint examiner prone to false 
positive errors suggests more generally an aggressive prosecutorial stance despite weak 
evidence.  However, we found no direct effect of the error type variable on ratings of the 
likelihood of conviction or case strength.  In sum, participants were quite sensitive to the 
fingerprint examiner’s level of proficiency in their assessments of the evidence and the 
strength of the case for conviction, but the type of errors committed by the fingerprint 
examiner on the proficiency test had no significant effect on any of these assessments.11   
 
 We next examined how much weight participants in the control condition gave the 
fingerprint evidence compared to those in the various proficiency level conditions.  
Participants who received the fingerprint evidence without information about the 
examiner’s performance on the proficiency test rated the likelihood that the defendant left 
his prints on the gun no differently than participants in the perfect proficiency, 98% 
proficiency, and 92% proficiency conditions, but participants in the control condition rated 
that likelihood to be significantly higher than participants in the 86% proficiency (t(407) = 
2.47, p = .014) and 66% proficiency conditions (t(435) = 4.45, p < .001).  These 
comparisons suggest that jurors assume a high, but not perfect, level of proficiency on the 
part of fingerprint examiners who testify at trial.    
 
 We included all of our individual difference measures in regression equations with 
the proficiency level and error type variables to predict ratings of the likelihood the 
defendant left his prints on the gun and likelihood of conviction.12  The error type variable 
continued to have no significant predictive value, while the proficiency level variable 
continued to be the best predictor of the weight given to the fingerprint evidence of all of 
the variables in the equation (β = .41, p < .001).  However, some groups did show 
differential responses to the fingerprint evidence.   
 
First, those with stronger aversions to false acquittals versus false convictions gave 
more weight to the fingerprint evidence regardless of experimental condition (β = .20, p = 
                                                 
11 One might initially view our results as evidence of a demand effect at work (i.e., that mock jurors simply 
used the proficiency information because it was given to them).  It is important to understand that such a  
characterization would not undercut the significance of the results because we are effectively testing whether 
jurors utilize information that they should utilize.  Thus, our results are important whether one labels the 
result a demand effect or not.  However, the full set of results casts doubt on the view that a simple demand 
effect was at work.  First, the importance of the proficiency information depended on the level of proficiency:  
the impact of the proficiency information was not uniform across levels.  Second, mock jurors did not 
distinguish among error types in using the proficiency information, which is inconsistent with the view that 
participants assumed that all information given to them should somehow alter their judgments.  Third, we 
used a between-subjects design, lessening the likelihood that participants would infer what information the 
researchers deemed important or the hypothesized effects because they were not aware of changes in the 
variables across the experimental conditions.  
12 We excluded participants in the control condition from these analyses.   
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.039).13  The proficiency level variable was least predictive of the ratings of likelihood that 
the defendant’s prints were on the gun for those with stronger aversions to false acquittals 
(β = .22), compared to those who see false convictions and false acquittals as equally 
harmful (β = .50) and those with a stronger aversion to false convictions (β = .44).  
However, none of these slopes differed significantly, so we cannot say that the groups were 
differentially sensitive to the proficiency level information used in our experiment. 14  
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between proficiency level and likelihood ratings within 
each error aversion group.  The flatter slope for persons most concerned about false 
acquittals suggests that this group may be more receptive to the prosecution’s forensic 
evidence, an important possibility that deserves further study.    
   
Figure 2: Print likelihood ratings by proficiency level and error aversion group 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 We examined whether the distribution of error aversions varied by experimental condition (i.e., perhaps 
the experimental information affected responses to the error aversion question or perhaps one condition by 
chance had more participants with a particular error aversion), but the distribution of error aversions did not 
vary by experimental condition. 
14 In an additional test using only proficiency level and error aversions as predictors of judged likelihood that 
the defendant’s prints were on the gun, both variables continued to produce main effects on judgments, but 
again the two predictor variables did not interact even when using this more focused comparison. 
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An interesting collateral finding is that many of our respondents saw false acquittals 
just as worthy of concern as false convictions.  While many respondents rated false 
convictions to be the more harmful error (425, 29.3%), many more participants viewed 
false acquittals and false convictions to be equally harmful to society (709, or 48.9%), and 
a sizeable minority rated false acquittals as more harmful (315, 21.7%).  Therefore, in our 
representative sample, the great majority did not share the criminal justice system’s 
stronger aversion to false convictions but rather saw false acquittals as equally worthy of 
concern, and these concerns appear to have affected how participants interpreted the 
prosecution’s evidence.    
 
 Women were more likely than men to rate false convictions and false acquittals as 
equally bad, while men were more likely to rate false convictions as worse (χ2(2) = 33.30, 
p < .001).  Whites and minorities other than African Americans were more likely to rate 
the two errors as equally harmful, while a greater percentage of African American 
respondents rated false convictions as more harmful (χ2(12) = 40.70, p < .001).  Those who 
had been arrested or who had a family member who had been arrested were more likely to 
rate false convictions as the more harmful error (χ2(2) = 12.04, p = .002).15 Those who 
characterized themselves as very liberal were most likely to view false convictions as the 
more serious error (χ2(8) = 25.35, p < .01); in general, the more conservative the 
respondents, the greater the number rating the two errors as equally bad or rating false 
acquittals as the more serious error.  As education increased, the percentage of participants 
rating false convictions as the more serious error increased (χ2(12) = 27.65, p = .006).16   
 
 Participants’ level of objective numeracy (β = .27, p = .003) and race (β = .27, p = 
.003) also significantly predicted the weight assigned to the fingerprint evidence.  Persons 
higher in objective numeracy gave the fingerprint evidence significantly more weight than 
those lower in objective numeracy.  However, this relation held only at two levels of 
examiner proficiency (scores of 92% and 98%).  In light of the small number of highly 
numerate participants in our sample (only 93 participants, or 6.4%, answered three of the 
numeracy items correctly and only 21, or 1.4%, answered all four items correctly) and the 
limited scope of this effect, further study is needed to determine whether highly numerate 
individuals interpret proficiency information differently than less numerate individuals.  
White and Asian participants on average gave higher ratings to the likelihood that the 
defendant’s prints were on the gun than Blacks and Hispanics (M = 8.01 vs. 7.24, t(1285) 
= 4.11, p < .001), but all racial/ethnic groups were sensitive to the examiner’s proficiency 
level when setting likelihood ratings (i.e., race/ethnicity and proficiency level did not 
interact).   Note also that the effects associated with these individual difference variables 
were smaller than the effect observed for proficiency level.  Therefore, these individual 
differences appeared to play less of a role in evaluations of the fingerprint evidence than 
did the examiner’s proficiency level.  
 
 Finally, we examined general views on the reliability of fingerprint and DNA 
evidence. Consistent with prior research (Garrett & Mitchell, 2013), we found that the great 
                                                 
15 African Americans and Hispanics reported higher rates of arrests than Whites and Asians (39% v. 23%; 
χ2(1) = 41.61, p < .001 ). 
16 Education level and political views were not correlated in our sample. 
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majority of respondents believed that each individual’s fingerprints are unique (1,222, or 
84.3%) or are probably unique (189, or 13%), while a few believed they that fingerprints 
are not individually unique (39, or 2.7%).  A slightly smaller majority also believed that 
each individual’s DNA is unique (1,188, or 81.9%) or is probably unique (173, or 11.9%), 
while a few believed an individual’s DNA is not unique (89, or 6.1%).   
 
Our participants viewed fingerprint evidence as generally reliable (M = 1.89, SD = 
.88, on a 1 to 6 scale ranging from very reliable to very unreliable), and believed that the 
average juror has considerable confidence in both fingerprint and DNA evidence (M = 
2.89, SD = .68 and M = 3.23, SD = .73, respectively, with both rated on 1 to 4 scale ranging 
from no confidence in the evidence to a belief that the evidence is infallible).  However, 
views on the general reliability of fingerprint evidence were correlated with certain group 
characteristics:  men tended to rate fingerprint evidence as more reliable than women did 
(τ = .06, p = .023), older participants were more likely to rate the evidence’s reliability 
higher (τ = -.05, p = .02), as were more conservative respondents (τ = -.07, p = .001) and 
those lower in subjective numeracy (τ = .10, p < .001).  These differences across groups 
tended to be in the degree to which the evidence was rated as being reliable, with some 
more likely to choose very reliable over just reliable or somewhat reliable (e.g., Mmen = 
1.94 vs. Mwomen = 2.01, t(1448) = -1.67, p = .095), and these effects were quite small across 
the various group lines.  Thus, it appears that most jurors come to trial predisposed to trust 
fingerprint and DNA evidence and see such evidence as an excellent means of connecting 
particular individuals to crimes given the unique and generally reliable nature of such 
evidence.  However, the intensity of these views may differ somewhat across groups.   
 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
Fingerprint examiners who score better on proficiency tests are less likely to make 
mistakes in their fieldwork than less proficient fingerprint examiners, holding other 
variables constant.  This logic explains why accreditation bodies require proficiency testing 
and why scientists have recommended more rigorous proficiency testing (PCAST, 2016). 
Such testing is necessary to assess “the competence of particular examiners,” but it is also 
an important way to engage in “validation and quality assurance” (Amercan Association 
for the Advancement of Sciences, 2017, p. 48).  Judges should therefore take proficiency 
testing information into account when determining whether a forensic analyst should be 
admitted to testify as an expert witness.  The ultimate factfinder should also take into 
account proficiency testing information when deciding how much weight to give to a 
forensic analyst’s opinions at trial, giving greater weight to the opinions of more proficient 
experts.  
  
The participants in our study consistently assigned greater weight to fingerprint 
match testimony coming from the more proficient fingerprint examiners.  In making these 
weight assessments, participants consistently focused only on how many errors were made 
on the proficiency test and not on the type of errors made on the test.  This result held true 
across the many diverse groups within our nationally representative sample, even for those 
persons most concerned about false convictions, who should be most sensitive to the 
prospect of a false identification.   
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These results suggest that jurors are quite sensitive to individualized information 
about a forensic analyst’s error rate, and that this concern about the examiner’s level of 
care and expertise does not vary with the nature of an expert’s errors.  Whether that result 
will hold for fields other than fingerprint comparisons, and whether there are some 
situations in which error type information will be independently influential, are questions 
that can only be answered with further studies.  But the present study provides strong 
evidence that jurors can understand, and will use, proficiency testing information to assess 
an expert’s testimony.  Jurors recognize that not all experts are equally expert, and they 
condition their use of an expert’s testimony on level of expertise.   
 
The ability of our sample of potential jurors to properly understand proficiency 
testing information is shown by the way in which participant ratings of the fingerprint 
examiner’s expertise tracked the examiner’s level of proficiency.  Participants understood 
that performance on a proficiency test is an empirical measure of expertise, and our 
participants used this proficiency information to calibrate their judgments about whether 
the defendant’s fingerprints were on the gun used in the crime, and thus whether the 
defendant committed the crime.  When jurors receive information about flaws or 
weaknesses in a forensic method or receive general information about a field’s error rates, 
the juror cannot be sure how that information applies to the particular analyst in the case at 
hand.  But when jurors receive information about the testifying expert’s own performance 
on a proficiency test that simulates the task involved in the case at hand, the relevance of 
this information is easy to comprehend and hard to ignore.   
 
The fact that jurors focused on proficiency level, and did not differentiate among 
types of errors on the proficiency tests, suggests that overall accuracy rather than avoidance 
of particular types of errors most concerned our participants.  This finding suggests that 
CTS and other testing authorities should clearly report overall levels of accuracy for items 
for which an identification opinion is given and separately report the  number of items for 
which specimens were rated inconclusive or not suitable for comparison.  Given the 
conservative response bias observed on many proficiency tests that favor avoiding a match 
or no-match opinion (e.g., Haber & Haber, 2014), an important avenue of future study will 
be to examine how high rates of “deciding not to decide” (Dror & Langenburg, 2018) on 
proficiency tests affects the weight given to an examiner’s opinions at trial.  It may well be 
that jurors deem such behavior evidence of caution as opposed to evidence of test strategy 
or lack of confidence in the examiner’s own ability.  Future studies may therefore fruitfully 
examine the impact of levels of accuracy on attempted items as well as levels of opinion 
avoidance. 
 
Our study also revealed that, absent specific information on a fingerprint 
examiner’s level of proficiency, jurors are likely to assume that a fingerprint examiner has 
a high, if not perfect, level of proficiency.  Evidentiary assessments in our control 
condition, in which participants received no proficiency testing information, mirrored 
evidentiary assessments in the conditions in which the examiner scored above 90% on a 
proficiency test.  Presently, individual examiners’ proficiency testing scores are not 
publicly available (and often courts will not order their discovery in litigation), but given 
the number of errors observed on many of the proficiency tests that are given annually to 
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examiners, there are likely to be a number of fingerprint examiners testifying in trials who 
could not score above 90% on a realistic proficiency test.   
 
Our results thus demonstrate not only the probative value of proficiency testing 
information in the eyes of potential jurors but also the need for  individualized proficiency 
testing information to address possible misconceptions about a fingerprint examiner’s error 
rate.  In the past, some fingerprint examiners have claimed near infallibility in court 
(International Association for Identification, 2010; National Research Council, 2009). 
Individualized proficiency testing is needed to test the validity of such claims and to 
provide jurors with an empirically-derived measure of the examiner’s actual level of care 
and expertise. 
 
Although the effects of the proficiency level variable were robust across many 
different demographic and social groups, some groups did differ in their responses to the 
fingerprint evidence.  Most notable was our finding that persons who believe that false 
acquittals do more harm to society than false convictions gave greater weight to the 
fingerprint examiner’s testimony, but even these persons conditioned the weight assigned 
to the evidence on the examiner’s level of proficiency.  The number of people who have a 
stronger aversion to false acquittals is not negligible:  a significant minority saw false 
acquittals as more harmful to society than false convictions, and almost half of our sample 
saw false acquittals and false convictions as equally harmful to society.  These differences 
in error aversions are likely to have important effects on how evidence is interpreted and 
weighed in any criminal case and deserve further study.  Jurors’ error preferences may 
affect not only the weight given to evidence but also how the reasonable doubt and 
presumption of innocence instructions will be interpreted and applied.   
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Jurors tend to assume that fingerprint examiners who testify at trials are highly 
proficient at making fingerprint identifications, yet the available proficiency testing data 
suggests that this assumption will not be true for all examiners (National Rsesarch Council, 
2009; PCAST, 2016).  This study demonstrates that jurors can properly understand 
proficiency information and use this information in logical ways if that information is 
available to them.  Information from blind proficiency tests that mimic case conditions 
should be routinely collected across the forensic disciplines, and this information should 
be provided to judges and jurors so that potentially mistaken assumptions about proficiency 
can be replaced with individualized data on an expert’s true level of proficiency. 
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